The perpetrators of a criminal act may be direct perpetrators, indirect perpetrators and accomplices. In the case of direct perpetration, the perpetrator actualizes all the elements of the crime themselves. Complicity and indirect perpetration require several persons and are not regulated in the Swiss Criminal Code. In the following blog contribution, the distinction between the concepts of indirect perpetration and complicity is drawn out. If you have any questions about the distinction between indirect perpetration and complicity, a criminal lawyer in St. Gallen, Zurich or Frauenfeld can help you.
In the case of indirect perpetration, the (indirect) perpetrator does not carry out the act themselves, but has it carried out by another person, acting as his intermediary or instrument. The indirect perpetrator is assigned perpetration of the crime because they induced a criminally relevant weakness in the intermediary or exploited an existing personal vulnerability. Such a weakness can be exploited through the intermediary’s mistaken perception of the facts or their inability to accept responsibility for the crime. This weakness excludes the criminal responsibility of the intermediary, meaning they cannot be held liable. The indirect perpetrator, on the other hand, is punished as if he had committed the crime himself. Further information on indirect perpetration can be obtained from our team of criminal lawyers in Zurich, Frauenfeld or St. Gallen.
Consider the following scenario. A shouts from inside the readily departing train to B, standing on the platform, asking him to pass A’s suitcase through the window, because he has left it on the platform. B heaves the suitcase through the train window without realizing that it belongs to someone else, C. B is mistake in the facts at hand, since he assumes that no offense is being committed in this scenario. A takes advantage of this weakness to steal C’s suitcase.
In the case of complicity, an act is committed collaboratively by several persons. The perpetration is allocated to multiple people, none of who are used as a tool by the others. Control over the course of events is not in the hands of an individual, but in the hands of the collective. The accomplices are not only punished for the part they actually committed, but for all contributions, too.
The prerequisites for complicity are a joint intention to commit the act and the joint execution of the act. The joint intention to commit an act is the mutual agreement to carry out a certain act through joint actions dividing the task. The joint intention does not have to be explicitly finalised, but can also be implied, by even just a meaningful glance. The decision to commit a crime does not have to be made simultaneously; someone can contribute successively after the execution of the crime has begun. Mutual corrections are also possible at any time. If a person commits an offense exceeding the agreed upon act, they alone are held responsible. The offense is considered as having been committed collaboratively if the contribution of an offender is so essential to the planning or to the execution of the offense that without them, it would not have occurred. Thus, the co-perpetrator does not have to actively participate in the act; it is sufficient that they were substantially involved in the planning of the offense. The accomplices are all punished for the same offense.